mandag 30. mai 2011

Fortune 500 - smakebiter

Her følger noen topplister som jeg har ekstrahert fra Fortune 500, den årlige rangeringen av USAs 500 største bedrifter (Fortune, Europe edition, on display until June 6, 2011).

DE 10 STØRSTE ETTER OMSETNING
1. Wal-Mart Stores: 422 mrd USD
2. Exxon Mobil: 355 mrd USD
3. Chevron: 196 mrd USD
4. ConocoPhilips: 185 mrd USD
5. Fannie May: 154 mrd USD
6. General Electric: 152 mrd USD
7. Berkshire Hathaway: 136 mrd USD
8. General Motors: 136 mrd USD
9. Bank of America Corp.: 134 mrd USD
10. Ford Motor: 129 mrd USD

Fannie May, som i 2009 var rangert som nr. 81, har kommet inn på listen etter regnskapstekniske justeringer. Ellers gjør General Motors langt på vei et comeback - i 2009 var de nr. 15. Berkshire Hathaway er nye på topp 10. Bank of America faller fra 5. til 9. (og Citibank fra 12. til 14), mens J. P. Morgan Chase & Co er blant dem som falt ut av topp 10 (ned fra 9. til 13. plass). Dermed er det bare én finansinstitusjon på topp 10, og ingen på topp 5.

Det er interessant å merke seg hvilke av de aller mest kjente selskapene som er fraværende her helt i toppen målt etter omsetning. Et par av disse, som også er blant selskapene med høyest børsverdi, finner vi imidlertid igjen i topplista for de mest profitable selskapene.

DE 10 SELSKAPENE MED HØYEST OVERSKUDD [RANGERT ETTER OMSETNING I KLAMMER]
1. Exxon Mobil [2]: 30 mrd USD
2. AT&T [12]: 20 mrd USD
3. Chevron [3]: 19 mrd USD
4. Microsoft [38]: 19 mrd USD
5. J. P. Morgan Chase & Co [13]: 17 mrd USD
6. Wal-Mart Stores [1]: 16 mrd USD
7. IBM [18]: 15 mrd USD
8. Apple [35]: 14 mrd USD
9. Johnson & Johnson [40]: 13 mrd USD
10. Berkshire Hathaway [7]: 13 mrd USD

Enda tydeligere trer børsyndlingene frem på topplista over de mest profitable selskapene målt i prosent av omsetningen. Her er ingen av de 20 største selskapene på topp 50.

DE 10 SELSKAPENE MED HØYEST OVERSKUDD I PROSENT AV OMSETNINGEN [I KLAMMER: RANGERT ETTER OMSETNING, RANGERT ETTER BØRSVERDI]
1. XXX
2. XXX
3. VISA [297, 42]: 37 %
4. XXX
5. Coca Cola [70, 17]: 34 %
6. Mastercard [410, 91]: 34 %
7. XXX
8. Microsoft [38, 3]: 30 %
9. XXX
10. Google [92, 8]: 29 %

Se også:
Fortune Global 500: Liste over verdens største arbeidsgivere

Fortune Global 500: Liste over verdens 12 billionselskaper

Fortune Global 500: Hvilke land er best representert?

fredag 27. mai 2011

Min kommentar i The Economist-debatt om vekst i verdensøkonomien 2011-2013


Dagens graf fra The Economist, gjengitt over, viser IMFs fremskrivning for store økonomier fra idag (eller rettere sagt BNP for de siste 12 mnd) til september 2013 (eller rettere sagt forventet BNP okt. 2012-sep. 2013). Ifølge The Economist venter IMF at verdensøkonomien skal vokse fra dagens 65 billioner USD til 75 billioner USD, en vekst på ikke mindre enn 15 % på 2 1/3 år.

Her er min kommentar:
Utopian Realism wrote:
May 27th 2011 6:48 GMT

This puzzles me: A number of the countries included appears to gain in growth as measured here due to stronger currencies relative to the US dollar. But if the dollar is, in consequence, expected to get weaker relative to these other currencies, then how come the US is expected to grow by as much as 9,7 % over the next 2 years and 4 months? It would really be helpful to know what USD depreciation is factored in here.


This said, expected USD depreciation relative to most other major currencies would explain why the 'world GDP' is expected to grow by as much as 15 % over 2,333 years (which would otherwise seem to be quite a mouthful). On the other hand, how telling is that growth number if it is based on a weaker dollar? With a weaker dollar, even constant production worldwide would appear as a growing world economy, in dollar terms.


Now here's a challenge: Try presenting these predictions in terms of a major currency which is extected to get stronger, not weaker. The result, ironically, of choosing one of the "emerging" currencies as the default measure instead of the US dollar, would be that the world economy would not appear to be growing all that fast afterall.

Alle mine kommentarer på The Economists nettsider finner du her.

torsdag 26. mai 2011

Om vannklosett, lykke og sånt (siste nytt fra OECD)

Figuren ovenfor viser Norges og de andre OECD-landenes plassering på OECDs nye indeks for "Better Life" (vertikal akse) målt opp mot deres BNP per innbygger (horisontal akse). Her scorer Norges best etter BNP, men vi er ikke HELT først på Better Life-indeksen.

OECDs nye indeks, som tar mål av seg å måle livskvalitet og slikt i kombinasjon med mer tradisjonelle økonomiske mål, bygger på 11 ulike kriterier, hvorav "life satisfaction" er én (de andre inkluderer inntekt/formue, utdanning, "miljø", helse, arbeidsliv/fritid mm).

Noe overraskende, gitt at Norge har OECDs høyeste BNP per innbygger, er det at det er kriteriet "inntekt" - som i realiteten inkluderer både husholdningsinntekt og husholdningsformue - Norge scorer aller dårligst på, på grunn av meget lave private formuer (noe som bare kan forklares med høy privat gjeld).

I en bloggpost påpeker Paul Chaffey at "[s]vakheten med UNDPs rangeringer [Human Development Index] er at de forutsetter at vi alle blir mer lykkelige av det samme". OECDs nye indeks er derimot så brukervennlig at den lar hver enkelt av oss vekte de 11 kriteriene. Paul Chaffeys personaliserte indeks finner du her, og min her. Mens Canada topper Chaffeys indeks, og Norge kommer på fjerde plass, toppes min indeks av Sverige, med Norge på sjette blant OECD-landene:

1. Sverige
2. Australia
3. Canada
4. New Zealand
5. Danmark
6. Norge
7. Finland
8. Island
9. Sveits
10. Irland

Slike indekser skal uansett tas med en klype salt. Som Chaffey påpeker avviker folks faktiske preferanser fra hva idealiserte indekser over "verdens beste land" osv. skulle innebære (i en tidligere bloggpost om Human Development Index har Chaffey ellers vist til at alle med BNP per innbygger over et visst nivå av UNDP gis samme score, 1.000). Et annet vesentlig poeng er at de brede "verdiene" OECD lar oss brukere vekte, i realiteten er representert ved nokså smale datasett. Det er f.eks. diskutabelt om det gir mening å rangere Norge så lavt på "inntekt" som OECD her gjør. Hva så med "miljø" ("environment")? Jo, det viser seg å bygge utelukkende på luftforurensing, målt etter "PM10 levels" (PM = Particulate Matter). Norske PM10-nivåer oppgis til 15,9 mikrogram per kubikkmeter, og dermed rangeres Norge på miljøområdet som nr. 14. Jeg går ut fra at disse verdiene gjelder bebodde strøk, nærmere avgrenset. Men hvor mye sier egentlig et slikt mål om miljøtilstanden i Norge generelt?

Kriteriet "housing" (boforhold) på sin side innebærer implisitt en preferanse for høyest mulig antall rom per person. Ikke alle ville være enige i at det er dét som best målbærer bostandarden. Bostandarden måles riktignok også etter et annet måltall, nemlig andel husstander uten vannklosett (et langt mer relevant mål, særlig i utviklingsland). Med 0,1 % husstander uten vannklosett rangeres Norge her på delt sjetteplass, etter en håndfull land med 0,0 % husstander uten vannklosett. Etter denne målestokken rangeres Estland helt sist i OECD - bak Chile, Mexico og Tyrkia - med 12,2 % av husstandene uten vannklosett. I et av de husene har jeg bodd. Livserfaring kaller man sånt! Livserfaring fikk jeg også på reise i India for en 12 års tid siden, der jeg lærte meg å klare meg noen uker uten tilgang på dopapir (og forøvrig innså hvor viktig kampen for utbredelse av minst ett toalett per landsby er - men da dreide det seg ikke om noe så luksuriøst som vannklosett, enn si et toalett med dopapir!). Megetsigende nok var det først da jeg var innom et luksushotell (for å gå på do) at jeg etter tre-fire uker på landsbygda så dopapir.

OECD-indeksen scorer , summa summarum, relativt høyt på min personlige nerdeindeks.

mandag 23. mai 2011

Spenstig Morgenbladet-kommentar om kjøttforbrukets globale problematikk

Sten Inge Jørgensen står bak en spenstig kronikk i Morgenbladet: "Samfunnsfiende nummer en".
Vår tids største utfordringer kan løses dersom det blir obligatorisk for skolebarn å besøke slakterier.

Landbruket er en av de største kildene til klimagassutslipp. Mest av alt kommer fra storfedriften ...

Et mer underkjent poeng, som vanskelig lar seg måle, er de mentale konsekvensene av å leve i et samfunn hvor noe av det mest grunnleggende som finnes, selve matproduksjonen, medfører dyrplageri.
Han knytter seg også opp mot fattigdomsproblematikk - som kjent er det idag millioner i fattigere land som sliter p.g.a. høye matpriser, og matprisene presses opp p.g.a. forbruks- og vekstmønsteret i nyrike og gammelrike land.
Gitt alvoret i konsekvensene av vårt kjøttforbruk trenger man ikke være noe geni for å forstå at det må ligge tunge politiske interesser bak en videreføring av dagens konsummønster. Mer presist sikter vi her til det faktum at svært få nordmenn er vegetarianere, og at et politisk parti som kjemper for vesentlig høyere kjøttpriser ville hatt små sjanser til å komme over sperregrensen.

lørdag 21. mai 2011

Svar på Ross Wolfes marxistiske kritikk av miljøbevegelsen

Jeg har på oppfordring kommentert Ross Wolfe's artikkel-lange blogg-post "Man and Nature, Part IV: A Marxist Critique of the 'Green' Environmental Movement". Bloggen hans heter The charnel-house: Historico-philosophical notes. Kommentaren min er gjengitt i sin helhet her (med en håndfull trykkfeil på plass, som i originalen).

In accordance with the title and slogan of my academic blog, "Utopian Realism", I pride myself of acknowledging the importance of being empirically informed about past and current ecological and social developments globally, and to the extent possible to have an informed view of possible future societies. I am generally aligned with deep ecology in Arne Næss' sense, and further somewhat aligned with anarchism - and Gandhism. Plus I am a vegetarian with a preference for organic produce of milk and egg. So should I feel attacked? Yes and no. My response will predominantly have the form of reference to empirical reality. Ideology carried out in isolation from empirical reality is always irrelevant, if not outright dangerous.

You write that small-scale organic farming is "an elitist phenomenon not only in the smug sense of ethical virtue that comes with buying organic or local, but also in a very real, economic sense". There is something to your points as to pricing of products from organic farming. Yes, organic farming is labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive (relatively speaking). However, I do not regard that a weakness of organic farming. Industrialized agriculture is characterized in economic terms by being capital-intensive. Now, the price of labour varies significantly (extremely) globally, and this is particularly visible and manifest within global agriculture. The price of machinery and such, on the other hand, is in comparison approximately equal globally (though local varietions in labour costs and taxes etc. spill over to some extent on local costs of machinery as well). Does this make organic farming potentially more of a rich-country phenomenon? Not necessarily (that depends on your exact definition of organic farming). Fair trade initiatives at their best could in principle allow for more labour-intensive agriculture than what is the norm locally in poorer countries as well (note that the very poorest countries have much less machinery in use in their agriculture today, which in part explains their low productivity (yields) in mainstream terms). Use of more machinery is always presented as cost-effective and as increasing productivity. The ways in which labour is priced - valued, though, can change the whole picture.

You diss the greens' preference for family farming. This is not only an ‘organic’ longing, however, but quite widespread in many declining rural societies. As a matter of fact, of course, a major transition is going on globally from small-scale family farming to industrialized agriculture with little labour and high productivity bought by way of capital investment. Whereas many of these family farms were initially subsistence farms (in a society where most poeple were farmwers), we are now about to leave a transitional phase where there have been a lot of family farms operating on market terms in a society where they have been a declining minority. This declining trend reflects increases in productivity and capital-intensity. In Norway - to use an example I am well informed about - there are very few family farms left (only approximately one out of ten farms are run by husband and wife who have no other occupation), and the number is rapidly declining. Even more telling is the fact that a majority of Norwegian farmers have more income from other jobs or activities than they do from their farming activity. It is thus not only the traditional family farm that is threatened, but equally important the farming profession as a full-time occupation. Now we can always discuss whether or not this is a social problem. I'd argue that it is.

And not only is it a social problem from a human point of view. It is further a social problem from the point of view of many farm animals. The declining number of farmers is not only mirrored in increased productivity and capital-intensity. These trends are both reflected in a steadily increasing ration of livestock per farmer. Engendering animal equivalents of mass societies, this is surely a social problem in its own right, and a characteristic feature of industrial agriculture. My claim is that we can legitimately talk about "ecological alienation" in many of these cases (think about chicken - some of which perversely advertised as 'free-range' - that share a floor with thousands of others and never see daylight).

Yet another parallel to declinging farmer numbers, increasing productivity and increasing ratios livestock/farmer is the increasing ratio of land per farmer which we see occuring in Western farming (in other parts of the world, the situation is quite another - namely, societies under demographic pressure (with rapidly increasing populations) and in lack of arable land often have to deal with the problem of having smaller and smaller pieces of land for the poor rurals. Here, what used to be a somewhat sustainable model of ‘subsistence-farming’ is in danger of being transformed to a specifically modern kind of poverty and misery).

You write: "To generalize the practice of local farming and small shops would mean a regression to a quasi-feudal state of existence, with massive urban depopulation and the death of probably 95% of the Earth’s people." Not necessarily so. "Local farming" and "small shops" can come in so many variations, so we cannot generalize this way. A local society I happen to know which is full of small shops is that of Suruí in the municipality of Magé in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro. I much enjoyed getting to know where everything was to be found - an exercise which took months, since it implied getting to know the whole neigbourhood, where many had small shops and bars and workshops etc., some of which with regular opening hours, others open whenever a customer knocked. I cannot see how the West's supermarket-model is necessarily representative of a higher level of civilization, nor how it should be taken to be superior in social terms. There is no de-urbanization involved, and much less any mass-death.

You write: “The Malthusian theory of a limit-point to the growth of population was materially disproven by the industrial revolution taking place before his very eyes.” While there is something to that as to his concrete theory, the industrial revolution proved nothing at all with regard to how many people the Earth can sustain. In particular, it did not at all prove that there are no limits whatsoever to how many the Earth can sustain. This remains a question of in part empirical nature. It is both conceivable

1) that the Earth can sustain a bigger human population that it does today, and

2) that the Earth can in the long turn only sustain a somewhat smaller human population than today BUT AT THE COST OF ITS MEDIUM-TERM CARRYING CAPACITY.

In other words, it is also conceivable that even maintaining today’s human population level will over time weaken the Earth’s carrying potential with regard to us. Besides, there are ethical issues concerning how big share of this planet’s land and resources we are to reserve for ourselves, and how much we let be available for other creatures (not counting our ‘affiliated species’ in agriculture, which are basically tools for our own ends).

While your claim that making local farming the only norm would mean the death of 95% is wildly exaggerated and as such erronous, it is true that organic and non-intensive farming is as a rule more land- and labour-intensive alike. This must pose a paradox to any well-informed green. One implication is that if all of today's agricultural produce was made organic, we would likely need to cultivate even more land (and one third of the Earth's total land mass is already in use for human food production, pastures etc. included). In that sense there is even a potential conflict between organic farming and food security for a growing human population (which will grow at least for another 30-40 years).

We must recall, however, that very much of today's land use in agriculture is tied to meat consumption. So here vegetarianism and organic farming are allies: The more vegetarians there are (or, to modify, the lower the meat consumption), the more organic farming do we have room for. On a utopian planet where everyone were vegetarians, we would have room for global, fully organic farming, PLUS we would be able to leave more land for wildlife. This ultimate combination is indeed possible. A global organic diet with a high share of meat is much less realistic, and would be much less environmentally friendly.

Let me also mention "The vegetarian's (or vegan's) paradox", which I have described in http://www.ut.ee/SOSE/sss/tonnessen311.pdf: "vegetarians, and especially radical ones, such as vegans, might face some paradoxes. For example: In a world of vegans — with no animal products consumed nor produced — what would be the fate of domesticated animals? ... In a vegan world, we would be left with two alternatives: Either we could keep them in zoos or as a sort of pets, or we would have to let them go extinct. What the vegan should ask herself is: Is an animal that depends on human beings for its pure existence really better off not existing?" A vegetarian's response to this paradix is telling of his or her values. It is fully possible to reply that domesticated animals are better off not existing, but if that is a vegetarian's position, it reveals that his/her dietary preference is NOT put into effect for the sake of the animals the vegetarian does not eat. Perhaps for the sake of wildlife, or for a kind of ethical purity?

I will not say much about Arne Næss and his view on population, but let me mention that I think his view on population control was not very fruitful (and I am saying this as a former student of demography). Nevertheless I share his vision of a human population that is in the long term substantially smaller than today's population. By long term we are talking about a transitional phase with pretty even decline in world population lasting for 300-1000 years (anything quicker would be inhumane, if we are talking about a deline on the scale of minus 90%). Næss himself underlined the importance of thinking about this only in a long-term perspective. He claimed to be reformistic on the short term, but revolutionary in the long term, and in the case of his view on population I think that is quite accurate (he used to talk about 100 kids being born this year, 99 the next, 98 the third...). One could argue in favor of such a development even without bringing in the intrinsic value of nature and other creatures. A somewhat lower world population in the long term would arguably increase the chance that future societies will be able to offer their citizens lives in abundance rather than misery.

As my idea about a transitional phase of 300-1000 years with regard to demography illustrates, I believe in developing and preparing something worthy of the name "a new civilization". My ideology of utopian realism presupposes that we can talk about three historical phases in this context:

1) Our age (the modern age, if you like)

2) A transitional phase - era of adjustment

3) A truly sustainable society

Following the deep ecology of Arne Næss, I believe that this desired development would entail profound changes in philosophy, science, economy, and ideology. Though much change would occur in our generation, my perspective implies that the change that can occur in our lifetimes would only mark the beginning of this new path in the development of humanity. We could initiate revolutionary change, and prepare revolutionary change, but not complete it.

You write: "What we are faced with is thus clear: either we must accept the renaturalization of humanity, or, inversely, the humanization (or socialization) of nature." A dangerous and simplified choice, I think - though, if we take it seriously, you seem to be winning as we speak. This maxime further reminds me of Heidegger's talk in "The fundamental concepts of metaphysics" about the human need for making itself at home in the world - by, I would argue, making the whole planet Earth its home, qua humanized. This is a valid perspective on human alienation. But it is a poor real-life solution of our existential problem (especially since we never will feel fully at home no matter how much we make the Earth "our own").

You write that your vision would entail "both the transformation of man and nature." “The Marxist vision of an emancipated society is one of abundance and plenitude, not of scarcity and shortage." Abundance of what? On a even further "humanized" planet, there would surely not be much abundance in wildlife. Is not that a kind of abundance that can enrich our lives as well? And as I have argued above, future economic abundance in future societies is more likely if we know to limit ourselves and to leave room for other creatures as well.

"It is a vision of unlimited human freedom," you write, "not within the constraints of an ascetic lifestyle.” Unlimited in what sense? On what planet? You seem in your concluding marxist vision to be neglecting empirical reality and our embeddedness in nature and on this concrete planet.

Keynes wrote in the wake of the Great Depression about humankind's age-old fight to overcome poverty - the problem of Man. His article was called ”Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren”. We can rightfully ask whether the "utopian" future society he sketched therein, a society where Man's problem would have been solved, has to a large extent been achieved. There are still poor people on this planet (and addressing that remains a core political task), but today a vast majority globally do not live in material misery. The global growth of the last 80 years has surpassed Keynes expectations. At what point will we realize that past utopias of a "society of abundance" has largely been achieved?

PS: For an evaluation of different scenarios about global economic growth up to the year of 2300, see my journal article "The future of growth", http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19644/.

Klima: Utrolig naivt fra Randers og Håndlykken

Jeg sitter og hører på radio. På NRKs Ekko (som sender fra Idéfestivalen, i anledning UiOs 200-årsjubileum) blir Jørgen Randers (BI) og Einar Håndlykken (ZERO) intervjuet om løsningen på klimaproblemet. Randers viser til Lavutslippsutvalgets forslag, som han var hovedmannen bak, og sier (som før) at han har vist at en løsning på problemet verken er teknisk vanskelig eller ville koste noe særlig. Klimaproblemet lar seg løse parallelt med løsning av fattigdomsproblemet - dvs. samtidig med at alle på kloden blir rike og teknisk avanserte.

Håndlykken stemmer i med å si at løsningen på klimaproblemet i grunn er veldig enkelt, han hevder nemlig at all verdens produkter lar seg produsere fullstendig uten (klima)utslipp. Løsningen består simpelthen i å gå over fra fossile til fornybare energikilder. Så kan forbruksmønstre ellers fortsette å utvikle seg som før.

På direkte spørsmål fra NRKs journalist svarer både Randers og Håndlykken at økonomisk vekst ikke er noe problem, bare vi altså går over til den riktige klimavennlige teknologien.

Det begge to har neglisjert, i sitt mangeårige og til dels prisverdige arbeid, er at klimaspørsmål ikke kan ses i isolasjon fra andre miljøspørsmål. Joda, det lar seg kanskje teknisk sett gjøre å gå mot et globalt høyforbrukssamfunn basert på avansert teknologi, uten særlige klimautslipp. Men et slikt samfunn hadde uansett blitt enormt ressurskrevende, særlig i form av bruk og binding av areal. Noe miljøvennlig samfunn ville det dermed ikke vært (det ville f.eks. bli svært dårlige kår for villmark og ville dyr). Håndlykkens og ZEROs syn på biodrivstoff er illustrerende i denne sammenheng. Idag blir en tredjedel av klodens landareal brukt til produksjon av mat (særlig kjøtt) til mennesker. Det er på ingen måte tilfelle at en "klimakur" alene vil gi oss fritt fram til å legge beslag på allverdens areal og ressurser. Et ytterst problematisk press på naturressursene blir det uansett. Randers og Håndlykkens fremtidsvisjon innebærer en nærmest total båndlegging av de fleste av klodens ressurser - for å realisere et høyteknologisk menneskesamfunn.

Begge to neglisjerer ovenipåkjøpet at økonomisk vekst må vurderes utifra et temporalt (tid-lig) perspektiv. Det er meningsløst simpelthen å si "ja" eller "nei" til om økonomisk vekst er forenlig med en klimavennlig politikk (i hvilke deler av verden? For hvor lang tid?). Se i denne sammenheng min tidsskriftartikkel "The future of growth".

Randers er med andre ord økonom, men forstår seg ikke på økonomi. Håndlykken er tilsvarende miljøverner, men forstår seg ikke på natur.

onsdag 18. mai 2011

Valgt som sekretær for og norsk representant i Nordisk forening i semiotikk

[Sakset fra min engelskspråklige blogg Utopian Realism]

Elected as secretary of NASS

NASS, the Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies, held its general assembly during its seventh conference, which took place in Lund, Sweden, May 6-8. The general assembly took place Saturday May 7th. Göran Sonesson stepped back as president and is now treasurer, whereas Luis Emilio Bruni of Denmark is our new president. I was elected as secretary of NASS, plus ordinary national representative of Norway (Torill Strand was elected as suppletant in this role).

These roles will likely remain for two years, until the next conference of NASS is arranged (in either Denmark or Estonia).

lørdag 14. mai 2011

Environment, embodiment and gender - innholdsfortegnelse

Den nye antologien Environment, Embodiment and Gender, redigert av Ane Faugstad Aarø og Johannes Servan, kan kjøpes fra utgiveren, Bergensforlaget Hermes Text. Boken er omtalt på nettsidene til Institutt for filosofi ved Universitetet i Bergen.

Contents:
Introduction
Part I: Introduction to ecophenomenology
Charles Brown: The unity of eco-phenomenology: A reply to Thomson
David Abram: The invisibles
Ted Toadvine: Ecophenomenology and the resistance of nature
Part II: Embodiment and gender
Monika Langer: Sartre in the company of Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Düden
Kirsti Kuosa: The embodied self and identity of three women living with multiple sclerosis
Claus Halberg: The tangible invisible: Irigaray's phenomenological critique of Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh
Joanna Handerek: On pain and fear. The concept of the body in Gernot Böhme's philosophy
Part III: Contemporary environmental philosophy
Gunnar Skirbekk: Ethical gradualism, beyond anthropocentrism and biocentrism?
Jørgen Pedersen: Habermas and environmental ethics
Svenn Anders Noer Lie & Fern Wickson: The relational ontology of deep ecology: A dispositional alternative to intrinsic value?
Jon Helén Pedersen: Løgstrup's philosophy as environmental philosophy
Stig Ingebrigtsen & Ove Jakobsen: Circulation economics - an ecological image of Man based upon an organic worldview
Linda McGuffe: Questions concerning technology and food
Jan van Boeckel: A point of no return. Artistic transgression in the more-than-human world
Morten Tønnessen: I, wolf. The ecology of existence

onsdag 11. mai 2011

Ulvesnakk

[Sakset fra Utopian Realism:]

The editorial presentation of my article "I, wolf: The ecology of existence" is to be found on page 14 in the introduction of Ane Faugstad Aarø and Johannes Servan, in Environment, Embodiment and Gender, and reads:
Morten Tønnessen describes in his essay "I, Wolf: The Ecology of Existence" the 'Umwelt' of wolves in Scandinavia, the life conditions that have led to the threat of extinction among wolves, as well as the policies and cultural values that oppose the existence of a very small population of wolves in Scandinavia. The myths of the threats that wolves represent in a community that has been based historically on sheep farming are balanced by Tønnessen's account of the semiotic Umwelt of wolves and their ecological alienation in this area today.
My bionote is on page 338.

onsdag 4. mai 2011

Dagens bilde: Binger for gravide purker

Hentet fra Wikipedias oppslag om verdens største svinekjøttprodusent, Smithfield Foods.

tirsdag 3. mai 2011

#Osama

Morten Tønnessen
@
@ "Vannbøffelen livnærer seg ... på ferskt gress og lever i vill tilstand i fuktige gressområder, sumper og lignende terreng."
Morten Tønnessen
Synes ellers det er råttent å gå etter statslederes barnebarn (enten det dreier seg om diktatorer eller andre). Gammeltestamentlig moral.
Morten Tønnessen
Jeg gråter krokodilletårer for mitt vannbøffelland
Morten Tønnessen
Apropos menneskelig skjold: Feig Osama, eller modig kone?
Morten Tønnessen
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@ Eller er det unntak (for de universelle menneskerettighetene)?
Morten Tønnessen
Om Osama hadde kommet seg til Norge (si Stryn) og søkt asyl ville Støre sagt at vi ikke kan utsende ham til land m/dødsstraff. Ironisk.
Morten Tønnessen
Er det ikke bittelite skummelt når Rush Limbaugh og Jonas Gahr Støre er hjertens enige?
Morten Tønnessen
Osama er død - leve Obama