Økonomisk vekst og økt privat forbruk er ikke et mål i seg selv. Vi vil derfor innføre flere mål enn BNP og ta i bruk nye styringsverktøy for å dreie samfunnsutviklingen i en grønn retning.
torsdag 25. august 2016
Full spagat om økonomisk vekst og forbruk i MDGs programforslag
fredag 7. august 2015
Svar til Siv Jensen: "Men hvorfor vekst?"
"At skattekutt er Frp sin hjertesak er ingen nyhet. Problemet er at premisset hun legger til grunn - nemlig at vi trenger skattekutt for å fremme vekstevnen i økonomien - er feilslått."
"Med en slik eventyrlig rikdom, er ikke det brennende spørsmålet hvordan vi kan vokse mer, men hvordan vi kan gjøre den velstanden vi alt har bærekraftig."
tirsdag 9. juni 2015
Debattinnlegg i Dagsavisen: Evig økonomisk vekst?
Evig økonomisk vekst?
Med unntak av Miljøpartiet De Grønne ser alle partier på Stortinget for seg at økonomisk vekst kan og bør fortsette til evig tid. Det er farlig naivt.
fredag 8. mai 2015
Debatt: Venstres vekst inn i himmelen
tirsdag 21. april 2015
Til debatt: Spørsmål til Venstre om vekst
tirsdag 9. april 2013
Moderasjon på norsk
- I en situasjon hvor norske lønninger ligger 69 % over snittet i EU, mer enn en fordobling i lønnsgapet til EU det siste tiåret?
- I en situasjon hvor økonomer og kommentatorer funderer på om Norge idet oljen en dag tar slutt må kutte i lønningene, nominelt?
- I en situasjon hvor flere land i Europa kutter i lønningene for folk flest?
torsdag 26. mai 2011
Om vannklosett, lykke og sånt (siste nytt fra OECD)
Figuren ovenfor viser Norges og de andre OECD-landenes plassering på OECDs nye indeks for "Better Life" (vertikal akse) målt opp mot deres BNP per innbygger (horisontal akse). Her scorer Norges best etter BNP, men vi er ikke HELT først på Better Life-indeksen.OECDs nye indeks, som tar mål av seg å måle livskvalitet og slikt i kombinasjon med mer tradisjonelle økonomiske mål, bygger på 11 ulike kriterier, hvorav "life satisfaction" er én (de andre inkluderer inntekt/formue, utdanning, "miljø", helse, arbeidsliv/fritid mm).
Noe overraskende, gitt at Norge har OECDs høyeste BNP per innbygger, er det at det er kriteriet "inntekt" - som i realiteten inkluderer både husholdningsinntekt og husholdningsformue - Norge scorer aller dårligst på, på grunn av meget lave private formuer (noe som bare kan forklares med høy privat gjeld).
I en bloggpost påpeker Paul Chaffey at "[s]vakheten med UNDPs rangeringer [Human Development Index] er at de forutsetter at vi alle blir mer lykkelige av det samme". OECDs nye indeks er derimot så brukervennlig at den lar hver enkelt av oss vekte de 11 kriteriene. Paul Chaffeys personaliserte indeks finner du her, og min her. Mens Canada topper Chaffeys indeks, og Norge kommer på fjerde plass, toppes min indeks av Sverige, med Norge på sjette blant OECD-landene:
1. Sverige
2. Australia
3. Canada
4. New Zealand
5. Danmark
6. Norge
7. Finland
8. Island
9. Sveits
10. Irland
Slike indekser skal uansett tas med en klype salt. Som Chaffey påpeker avviker folks faktiske preferanser fra hva idealiserte indekser over "verdens beste land" osv. skulle innebære (i en tidligere bloggpost om Human Development Index har Chaffey ellers vist til at alle med BNP per innbygger over et visst nivå av UNDP gis samme score, 1.000). Et annet vesentlig poeng er at de brede "verdiene" OECD lar oss brukere vekte, i realiteten er representert ved nokså smale datasett. Det er f.eks. diskutabelt om det gir mening å rangere Norge så lavt på "inntekt" som OECD her gjør. Hva så med "miljø" ("environment")? Jo, det viser seg å bygge utelukkende på luftforurensing, målt etter "PM10 levels" (PM = Particulate Matter). Norske PM10-nivåer oppgis til 15,9 mikrogram per kubikkmeter, og dermed rangeres Norge på miljøområdet som nr. 14. Jeg går ut fra at disse verdiene gjelder bebodde strøk, nærmere avgrenset. Men hvor mye sier egentlig et slikt mål om miljøtilstanden i Norge generelt?
Kriteriet "housing" (boforhold) på sin side innebærer implisitt en preferanse for høyest mulig antall rom per person. Ikke alle ville være enige i at det er dét som best målbærer bostandarden. Bostandarden måles riktignok også etter et annet måltall, nemlig andel husstander uten vannklosett (et langt mer relevant mål, særlig i utviklingsland). Med 0,1 % husstander uten vannklosett rangeres Norge her på delt sjetteplass, etter en håndfull land med 0,0 % husstander uten vannklosett. Etter denne målestokken rangeres Estland helt sist i OECD - bak Chile, Mexico og Tyrkia - med 12,2 % av husstandene uten vannklosett. I et av de husene har jeg bodd. Livserfaring kaller man sånt! Livserfaring fikk jeg også på reise i India for en 12 års tid siden, der jeg lærte meg å klare meg noen uker uten tilgang på dopapir (og forøvrig innså hvor viktig kampen for utbredelse av minst ett toalett per landsby er - men da dreide det seg ikke om noe så luksuriøst som vannklosett, enn si et toalett med dopapir!). Megetsigende nok var det først da jeg var innom et luksushotell (for å gå på do) at jeg etter tre-fire uker på landsbygda så dopapir.
OECD-indeksen scorer , summa summarum, relativt høyt på min personlige nerdeindeks.
mandag 23. mai 2011
Spenstig Morgenbladet-kommentar om kjøttforbrukets globale problematikk
Vår tids største utfordringer kan løses dersom det blir obligatorisk for skolebarn å besøke slakterier.Landbruket er en av de største kildene til klimagassutslipp. Mest av alt kommer fra storfedriften ...Et mer underkjent poeng, som vanskelig lar seg måle, er de mentale konsekvensene av å leve i et samfunn hvor noe av det mest grunnleggende som finnes, selve matproduksjonen, medfører dyrplageri.
Gitt alvoret i konsekvensene av vårt kjøttforbruk trenger man ikke være noe geni for å forstå at det må ligge tunge politiske interesser bak en videreføring av dagens konsummønster. Mer presist sikter vi her til det faktum at svært få nordmenn er vegetarianere, og at et politisk parti som kjemper for vesentlig høyere kjøttpriser ville hatt små sjanser til å komme over sperregrensen.
lørdag 21. mai 2011
Svar på Ross Wolfes marxistiske kritikk av miljøbevegelsen
In accordance with the title and slogan of my academic blog, "Utopian Realism", I pride myself of acknowledging the importance of being empirically informed about past and current ecological and social developments globally, and to the extent possible to have an informed view of possible future societies. I am generally aligned with deep ecology in Arne Næss' sense, and further somewhat aligned with anarchism - and Gandhism. Plus I am a vegetarian with a preference for organic produce of milk and egg. So should I feel attacked? Yes and no. My response will predominantly have the form of reference to empirical reality. Ideology carried out in isolation from empirical reality is always irrelevant, if not outright dangerous.
You write that small-scale organic farming is "an elitist phenomenon not only in the smug sense of ethical virtue that comes with buying organic or local, but also in a very real, economic sense". There is something to your points as to pricing of products from organic farming. Yes, organic farming is labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive (relatively speaking). However, I do not regard that a weakness of organic farming. Industrialized agriculture is characterized in economic terms by being capital-intensive. Now, the price of labour varies significantly (extremely) globally, and this is particularly visible and manifest within global agriculture. The price of machinery and such, on the other hand, is in comparison approximately equal globally (though local varietions in labour costs and taxes etc. spill over to some extent on local costs of machinery as well). Does this make organic farming potentially more of a rich-country phenomenon? Not necessarily (that depends on your exact definition of organic farming). Fair trade initiatives at their best could in principle allow for more labour-intensive agriculture than what is the norm locally in poorer countries as well (note that the very poorest countries have much less machinery in use in their agriculture today, which in part explains their low productivity (yields) in mainstream terms). Use of more machinery is always presented as cost-effective and as increasing productivity. The ways in which labour is priced - valued, though, can change the whole picture.
You diss the greens' preference for family farming. This is not only an ‘organic’ longing, however, but quite widespread in many declining rural societies. As a matter of fact, of course, a major transition is going on globally from small-scale family farming to industrialized agriculture with little labour and high productivity bought by way of capital investment. Whereas many of these family farms were initially subsistence farms (in a society where most poeple were farmwers), we are now about to leave a transitional phase where there have been a lot of family farms operating on market terms in a society where they have been a declining minority. This declining trend reflects increases in productivity and capital-intensity. In Norway - to use an example I am well informed about - there are very few family farms left (only approximately one out of ten farms are run by husband and wife who have no other occupation), and the number is rapidly declining. Even more telling is the fact that a majority of Norwegian farmers have more income from other jobs or activities than they do from their farming activity. It is thus not only the traditional family farm that is threatened, but equally important the farming profession as a full-time occupation. Now we can always discuss whether or not this is a social problem. I'd argue that it is.
And not only is it a social problem from a human point of view. It is further a social problem from the point of view of many farm animals. The declining number of farmers is not only mirrored in increased productivity and capital-intensity. These trends are both reflected in a steadily increasing ration of livestock per farmer. Engendering animal equivalents of mass societies, this is surely a social problem in its own right, and a characteristic feature of industrial agriculture. My claim is that we can legitimately talk about "ecological alienation" in many of these cases (think about chicken - some of which perversely advertised as 'free-range' - that share a floor with thousands of others and never see daylight).
Yet another parallel to declinging farmer numbers, increasing productivity and increasing ratios livestock/farmer is the increasing ratio of land per farmer which we see occuring in Western farming (in other parts of the world, the situation is quite another - namely, societies under demographic pressure (with rapidly increasing populations) and in lack of arable land often have to deal with the problem of having smaller and smaller pieces of land for the poor rurals. Here, what used to be a somewhat sustainable model of ‘subsistence-farming’ is in danger of being transformed to a specifically modern kind of poverty and misery).
You write: "To generalize the practice of local farming and small shops would mean a regression to a quasi-feudal state of existence, with massive urban depopulation and the death of probably 95% of the Earth’s people." Not necessarily so. "Local farming" and "small shops" can come in so many variations, so we cannot generalize this way. A local society I happen to know which is full of small shops is that of Suruí in the municipality of Magé in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro. I much enjoyed getting to know where everything was to be found - an exercise which took months, since it implied getting to know the whole neigbourhood, where many had small shops and bars and workshops etc., some of which with regular opening hours, others open whenever a customer knocked. I cannot see how the West's supermarket-model is necessarily representative of a higher level of civilization, nor how it should be taken to be superior in social terms. There is no de-urbanization involved, and much less any mass-death.
You write: “The Malthusian theory of a limit-point to the growth of population was materially disproven by the industrial revolution taking place before his very eyes.” While there is something to that as to his concrete theory, the industrial revolution proved nothing at all with regard to how many people the Earth can sustain. In particular, it did not at all prove that there are no limits whatsoever to how many the Earth can sustain. This remains a question of in part empirical nature. It is both conceivable
1) that the Earth can sustain a bigger human population that it does today, and
2) that the Earth can in the long turn only sustain a somewhat smaller human population than today BUT AT THE COST OF ITS MEDIUM-TERM CARRYING CAPACITY.
In other words, it is also conceivable that even maintaining today’s human population level will over time weaken the Earth’s carrying potential with regard to us. Besides, there are ethical issues concerning how big share of this planet’s land and resources we are to reserve for ourselves, and how much we let be available for other creatures (not counting our ‘affiliated species’ in agriculture, which are basically tools for our own ends).
While your claim that making local farming the only norm would mean the death of 95% is wildly exaggerated and as such erronous, it is true that organic and non-intensive farming is as a rule more land- and labour-intensive alike. This must pose a paradox to any well-informed green. One implication is that if all of today's agricultural produce was made organic, we would likely need to cultivate even more land (and one third of the Earth's total land mass is already in use for human food production, pastures etc. included). In that sense there is even a potential conflict between organic farming and food security for a growing human population (which will grow at least for another 30-40 years).
We must recall, however, that very much of today's land use in agriculture is tied to meat consumption. So here vegetarianism and organic farming are allies: The more vegetarians there are (or, to modify, the lower the meat consumption), the more organic farming do we have room for. On a utopian planet where everyone were vegetarians, we would have room for global, fully organic farming, PLUS we would be able to leave more land for wildlife. This ultimate combination is indeed possible. A global organic diet with a high share of meat is much less realistic, and would be much less environmentally friendly.
Let me also mention "The vegetarian's (or vegan's) paradox", which I have described in http://www.ut.ee/SOSE/sss/tonnessen311.pdf: "vegetarians, and especially radical ones, such as vegans, might face some paradoxes. For example: In a world of vegans — with no animal products consumed nor produced — what would be the fate of domesticated animals? ... In a vegan world, we would be left with two alternatives: Either we could keep them in zoos or as a sort of pets, or we would have to let them go extinct. What the vegan should ask herself is: Is an animal that depends on human beings for its pure existence really better off not existing?" A vegetarian's response to this paradix is telling of his or her values. It is fully possible to reply that domesticated animals are better off not existing, but if that is a vegetarian's position, it reveals that his/her dietary preference is NOT put into effect for the sake of the animals the vegetarian does not eat. Perhaps for the sake of wildlife, or for a kind of ethical purity?
I will not say much about Arne Næss and his view on population, but let me mention that I think his view on population control was not very fruitful (and I am saying this as a former student of demography). Nevertheless I share his vision of a human population that is in the long term substantially smaller than today's population. By long term we are talking about a transitional phase with pretty even decline in world population lasting for 300-1000 years (anything quicker would be inhumane, if we are talking about a deline on the scale of minus 90%). Næss himself underlined the importance of thinking about this only in a long-term perspective. He claimed to be reformistic on the short term, but revolutionary in the long term, and in the case of his view on population I think that is quite accurate (he used to talk about 100 kids being born this year, 99 the next, 98 the third...). One could argue in favor of such a development even without bringing in the intrinsic value of nature and other creatures. A somewhat lower world population in the long term would arguably increase the chance that future societies will be able to offer their citizens lives in abundance rather than misery.
As my idea about a transitional phase of 300-1000 years with regard to demography illustrates, I believe in developing and preparing something worthy of the name "a new civilization". My ideology of utopian realism presupposes that we can talk about three historical phases in this context:
1) Our age (the modern age, if you like)
2) A transitional phase - era of adjustment
3) A truly sustainable society
Following the deep ecology of Arne Næss, I believe that this desired development would entail profound changes in philosophy, science, economy, and ideology. Though much change would occur in our generation, my perspective implies that the change that can occur in our lifetimes would only mark the beginning of this new path in the development of humanity. We could initiate revolutionary change, and prepare revolutionary change, but not complete it.
You write: "What we are faced with is thus clear: either we must accept the renaturalization of humanity, or, inversely, the humanization (or socialization) of nature." A dangerous and simplified choice, I think - though, if we take it seriously, you seem to be winning as we speak. This maxime further reminds me of Heidegger's talk in "The fundamental concepts of metaphysics" about the human need for making itself at home in the world - by, I would argue, making the whole planet Earth its home, qua humanized. This is a valid perspective on human alienation. But it is a poor real-life solution of our existential problem (especially since we never will feel fully at home no matter how much we make the Earth "our own").
You write that your vision would entail "both the transformation of man and nature." “The Marxist vision of an emancipated society is one of abundance and plenitude, not of scarcity and shortage." Abundance of what? On a even further "humanized" planet, there would surely not be much abundance in wildlife. Is not that a kind of abundance that can enrich our lives as well? And as I have argued above, future economic abundance in future societies is more likely if we know to limit ourselves and to leave room for other creatures as well.
"It is a vision of unlimited human freedom," you write, "not within the constraints of an ascetic lifestyle.” Unlimited in what sense? On what planet? You seem in your concluding marxist vision to be neglecting empirical reality and our embeddedness in nature and on this concrete planet.
Keynes wrote in the wake of the Great Depression about humankind's age-old fight to overcome poverty - the problem of Man. His article was called ”Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren”. We can rightfully ask whether the "utopian" future society he sketched therein, a society where Man's problem would have been solved, has to a large extent been achieved. There are still poor people on this planet (and addressing that remains a core political task), but today a vast majority globally do not live in material misery. The global growth of the last 80 years has surpassed Keynes expectations. At what point will we realize that past utopias of a "society of abundance" has largely been achieved?
PS: For an evaluation of different scenarios about global economic growth up to the year of 2300, see my journal article "The future of growth", http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19644/.
Klima: Utrolig naivt fra Randers og Håndlykken
Håndlykken stemmer i med å si at løsningen på klimaproblemet i grunn er veldig enkelt, han hevder nemlig at all verdens produkter lar seg produsere fullstendig uten (klima)utslipp. Løsningen består simpelthen i å gå over fra fossile til fornybare energikilder. Så kan forbruksmønstre ellers fortsette å utvikle seg som før.
På direkte spørsmål fra NRKs journalist svarer både Randers og Håndlykken at økonomisk vekst ikke er noe problem, bare vi altså går over til den riktige klimavennlige teknologien.
Det begge to har neglisjert, i sitt mangeårige og til dels prisverdige arbeid, er at klimaspørsmål ikke kan ses i isolasjon fra andre miljøspørsmål. Joda, det lar seg kanskje teknisk sett gjøre å gå mot et globalt høyforbrukssamfunn basert på avansert teknologi, uten særlige klimautslipp. Men et slikt samfunn hadde uansett blitt enormt ressurskrevende, særlig i form av bruk og binding av areal. Noe miljøvennlig samfunn ville det dermed ikke vært (det ville f.eks. bli svært dårlige kår for villmark og ville dyr). Håndlykkens og ZEROs syn på biodrivstoff er illustrerende i denne sammenheng. Idag blir en tredjedel av klodens landareal brukt til produksjon av mat (særlig kjøtt) til mennesker. Det er på ingen måte tilfelle at en "klimakur" alene vil gi oss fritt fram til å legge beslag på allverdens areal og ressurser. Et ytterst problematisk press på naturressursene blir det uansett. Randers og Håndlykkens fremtidsvisjon innebærer en nærmest total båndlegging av de fleste av klodens ressurser - for å realisere et høyteknologisk menneskesamfunn.
Begge to neglisjerer ovenipåkjøpet at økonomisk vekst må vurderes utifra et temporalt (tid-lig) perspektiv. Det er meningsløst simpelthen å si "ja" eller "nei" til om økonomisk vekst er forenlig med en klimavennlig politikk (i hvilke deler av verden? For hvor lang tid?). Se i denne sammenheng min tidsskriftartikkel "The future of growth".
Randers er med andre ord økonom, men forstår seg ikke på økonomi. Håndlykken er tilsvarende miljøverner, men forstår seg ikke på natur.
torsdag 20. januar 2011
Dagens graf: Energi/BNP
Sakset fra The Economists Power slide.
torsdag 2. desember 2010
torsdag 25. november 2010
Nord-Korea på europeisk nivå om 2 år??
Jeg er all for å balansere vårt inntrykk av Nord-Korea - men da må man i det minste holde seg til fakta.
- Siden 1995 har «militæret først-politikken» opphørt, nå er det økonomien først. I 2012 kan Nord-Korea konkurrere med en del europeiske land i velferd, da er programmet «Kampanje for folks velferd» ferdig. Det tror jeg de vil kunne klare.
Men disse tallene stoler vel ikke Bjørnar Simensen på? De er nemlig anslag fra USA (og - NB - basert på tidligere anslag til den troverdige økonomen Angus Maddison). Spørsmålet er om det finnes bedre tall å vise til, fra regimet selv? Vis meg dem gjerne.
onsdag 24. november 2010
Finanskrisen og globale klimautslipp
USA: - 6,9%
Japan: - 11,8%
Storbritannia -8,6%
Men i store framvoksende økonomier gikk de like kraftig opp:
India: +6,2%
Totalt sett på planeten Jorda ble utfallet at de globale CO2-utslippene falt med 1,3% fra rekordutslippsåret 2008 til 2009 - i det første året siden andre verdenskrig hvor man (muligens) opplevde redusert globalt BNP år-til-år.
Og i år ventes de globale utslippene å peke oppover igjen. Moral: Det er en tydelig sammenheng mellom økonomisk vekst og vekst i CO2-utslipp - men skal vi løse klimakrisen på den måten må vi se kraftig redusert BNP. Og for de som synes at dét høres naivt eller bakstreversk ut, så skal en huske at et mangedoblet BNP 50-100 år inn i fremtiden - som er mainstream-scenariet - vil gjøre oppgaven vanskeligere jo høyere vekst vi har. Mer om det i The future of growth.
Kilde ellers i denne posten: AFP/SGGP English Edition.
fredag 29. oktober 2010
fredag 22. oktober 2010
Sentralbanksjefen: Teknokrat eller korrektiv?
Så vidt jeg kan se uttaler Olsen seg fullstendig konformt og i tråd med gjeldende valuta, så å si. Ved å understreke at Norge ikke bytter pengepolitikk bare fordi vi bytter sentralbanksjef, undervurderer han i bunn og grunn det ansvaret som følger med stillingen. Norge har i dag en rekke regjerings-utpekte posisjoner som spiller en rolle som aktivt korrektiv i offentligheten innen politisk debatt og politikk-utvikling. Olsen på sin side ser ikke ut til å spille kritiske spørsmål til de overordnede målene for norsk økonomisk politikk - å sikre "økt velstand" gjennom en stabiliserende pengepolitikk. Det bestemmende for pengepolitikken, uttalte Olsen i dag, er ikke hvem som sitter i stolen som sentralbanksjef, men utviklingen internasjonalt.
Det blir for passivt. Hadde jeg stilt som kandidat til stillingen som sentralbanksjef, ville jeg spilt inn til regjering og Finansdepartement at det overordnede målet for norsk pengepolitikk burde være å stabilisere norsk velstand på dagens nivå eller (fortrinnsvis) lavere. Norge og kloden er tjent med - om ikke annet - en lavere vekstrate, jf. min tidsskriftartikkel The Statistician's Guide to Utopia: The Future of Growth.
mandag 27. september 2010
Om troen på fire prosent
Riktignok har finansmarkedene i Oljefondets tid vært turbulente, og Oljefondet har tapt stort på først kun å satse på de allerede rike. Men på sikt avhenger fondet, og fondets avkastning, av veksten i verdensøkonomien. Hva slags fremtidsutsikter har den, på virkelig lang sikt? Som jeg har vist i tidsskriftartikkelen ”The Statistician’s Guide to Utopia: The Future of Growth” er det urimelig å forvente at en vekstrate tilsvarende den skyhøye veksten fra den første etterkrigstiden – og fra de ti første årene av dette årtusen – skal vare særlig lenge. Lenger utover i det 21. århundre blir det mer og mer sannsynlig at vekstraten blir lavere. Det bør den faktisk bli, dersom man ønsker at vekst skal være mulig på lang sikt.
Som OECD-økonomen Angus Maddison har demonstrert, har vekstraten til den globale økonomien historisk sett vært langt lavere. Med unntak av unntaksperiodene nevnt foran har BNP per capita siden 1820 vokst med mellom en halv og halvannen prosent årlig på globalt plan. Oljefondets avkastning hviler også på andre faktorer, som forholdstallet mellom kapitalisering og BNP, men konklusjonen er likevel klar: Å gå ut fra en lavere vekstrate er tryggere.
Morten Tønnessen, innehaver av Spør Filosofen
søndag 5. september 2010
Støtte til CASSEs posisjon i.f.t. økonomisk vekst
Whereas:
1) Economic growth, as defined in standard economics textbooks, is an increase in the production and consumption of goods and services, and;
2) Economic growth occurs when there is an increase in the multiplied product of population and per capita consumption, and;
3) The global economy grows as an integrated whole consisting of agricultural, extractive, manufacturing, and services sectors that require physical inputs and produce wastes, and;
4) Economic growth is often and generally indicated by increasing real gross domestic product (GDP) or real gross national product (GNP), and;
5) Economic growth has been a primary, perennial goal of many societies and most governments, and;
6) Based upon established principles of physics and ecology, there is a limit to economic growth, and;
7) There is increasing evidence that global economic growth is having negative effects on long-term ecological and economic welfare…
Therefore, we take the position that:
1) There is a fundamental conflict between economic growth and environmental protection (for example, biodiversity conservation, clean air and water, atmospheric stability), and;
2) There is a fundamental conflict between economic growth and the ecological services underpinning the human economy (for example, pollination, decomposition, climate regulation), and;
3) Technological progress has had many positive and negative ecological and economic effects and may not be depended on to reconcile the conflict between economic growth and long-term ecological and economic welfare, and;
4) Economic growth, as gauged by increasing GDP, is an increasingly dangerous and anachronistic goal, especially in wealthy nations with widespread affluence, and;
5) A steady state economy (that is, an economy with a relatively stable, mildly fluctuating product of population and per capita consumption) is a viable alternative to a growing economy and has become a more appropriate goal in large, wealthy economies, and;6) The long-run sustainability of a steady state economy requires its establishment at a size small enough to avoid the breaching of reduced ecological and economic capacity during expected or unexpected supply shocks such as droughts and energy shortages, and;
7) A steady state economy does not preclude economic development, a dynamic, qualitative process in which different technologies may be employed and the relative prominence of economic sectors may evolve, and;
8) Upon establishing a steady state economy, it would be advisable for wealthy nations to assist other nations in moving from the goal of economic growth to the goal of a steady state economy, beginning with those nations currently enjoying high levels of per capita consumption, and;
9) For many nations with widespread poverty, increasing per capita consumption (or, alternatively, more equitable distributions of wealth) remains an appropriate goal.
tirsdag 20. april 2010
BNP: Mitt innspill i The Economist
This house believes that GDP growth is a poor measure of improving living standards.Utopian Realism wrote:
Dear Sir,
for me it is impossible to answer the posted question with a simple 'yes' or 'no', because two matters appear to be confused at the very root of the debate:
a) whether or not GDP measures (there are various measures) are precise indicators of 'living standards'
b) whether or not growing GDP is a desirable political aim (for already wealthy nations)
It might very well be that the answer to a) is in the main yes, but the answer to b) no (if so, there is an optimal level of GDP, and GDP is not to be maximized, but optimalized).
This possibility, however, presupposes that the debate's term 'living standards' is highly ambiguous, and a poor choice of terms. Which it is. In market terms, GDP measures are quantitaive measures (even though they do refer to the 'demand' of economic stakeholders with means). The 'living standard' Oswald has in mind appears to be of a qualitative nature.
The Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss distinguished systematically between 'standard of living' (a quantitative measure of wealth) and 'quality of life'. If such a distinction had been introduced in the polled question, I would have been able to take a stand. As it stands, a 'yes' would imply conceptual ignorance, and a 'no' ethical ignorance.
Debatt om BNP som mål i The Economist
1) Hvorvidt BNP er et presist mål på velstand
GDP is a gravely dated pursuit. The first reason is the Easterlin Paradox (the empirical finding that countries do not become happier as they grow wealthier); the second is that global warming means it is necessary for Homo sapiens to make fewer things, to travel less, and to lean on the direct energy of the sun and water.
GDP is a key measure of a country's economic activity—the purpose for which it was designed. It was not designed to be, nor should be regarded as, a comprehensive measure of society's well-being. Nonetheless, it has also proven useful as a gauge of an economy's capacity to improve living standards.




